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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review in this
Appeal:
1.

Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants-

Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment?
2.

Did the District Court err in failing to apply a stan-

dard of substantial compliance with the relevant statute
regarding the execution of testamentary documents?
3.

Did the District Court err in granting Defendants-

Respondents1 Motion For Attorneys1 Fees?
4.

Did the District Court err in failing to make specific

findings of fact with regard to the Defendants-Respondents1
Motion For Attorneys1 Fees on the basis of alleged bad faith
conduct or other conduct violating Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wendell E. Taylor commenced this action to invalidate a
document entitled the Last Will And Testament of Grant R. Taylor
dated August 30, 1984 and, to give effect to the provisions of a
document dated June 30, 1984, executed by Grant R. Taylor and
witnessed by Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor (R. 2-6). By
the terms of the June 30, 1984 document, Grant R. Taylor agreed
to forgive a substantial debt owed him by Wendell E. Taylor (R.
104).
Defendants initially responded to Plaintiff's Complaint by
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filing a Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint With Prejudice
(R. 8). This Motion was never heard by the district court.
After the completion of some discovery, Defendants filed a Motion
For Summary Judgment, and a Motion For Attorneys Fees (R, 132,
200).

On or about March 24, 1986, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno

entered an order granting Defendants1 Motion For Summary
Judgment, dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding
Defendants attorneys' fees (R. 235, 236).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wendell E. Taylor, hereinafter "Wendell" was the brother of
Grant R. Taylor, hereinafter "decedent".

Decedent died on

September 26, 1984 (R.3, 99, 100, 101). In January of 1984,
decedent had loaned Wendell a significant amount of money
enabling Wendell to avoid a financial problem associated with
his residence (R. 102, 104).
On June 30, 1984, decedent dictated a document to another of
his brothers, Noel M. Taylor, which cancelled the debt owed him
by Wendell (R. 3, 12, 104). After the document was typed and
read back to the decedent by Noel M. Taylor, and in the presence
of Noel's wife, Geraldine, decedent executed it in the presence
of Noel and Geraldine Taylor (R. 168, 169, 176, 188). Thereafter,
Noel M. Taylor signed the document as a witness in the presence
of his wife Geraldine J. Taylor and decedent (R. 168, 169, 176,
188, 189). Geraldine J. Taylor did not execute this document at
this time (R. 188). However, Mrs. Taylor did sign the document
in the capacity of a witness on a subsequent date (R.

2

191-192).

The June 30/ 1984 document cancelling the debt owed by
Wendell to the decedent was intended by decedent to be a portion
of the decedent's final will and testament (R. 104). The decedent intended that the document supercede any previous or subsequent order of his, or anyone else, with regard to the
decedent's estate (R. 104).
The decedent created and executed this June 30, 1984 document because he believed "that in the presence of certain people
and by their instruction, future written negotiations may be
attempted to be made while I am under the influence of medicines
or coercion and not of my clear, free and sober desires.
deeply and positively believe could or will happen."

This I

(R. 104).

On or about August 30, 1984, decedent executed a document
entitled Last Will and Testament.

This document made no provi-

sion for Defendant Esther Taylor to inherit any of decedent's
estate.

(R. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81).

On or about August 27, 1984,

decedent created a revocable trust known as the Grant R. Taylor
Trust (R. 41-65, 78).

This trust was amended on September 21,

1984 (R. 66-76).
Decedent and Defendant Esther Taylor were divorced in
December of 1983. This divorce was an extremely bitter one (R.
100).

Notwithstanding this bitter divorce, they were allegedly

remarried on September 21, 1984, only nine months after the
divorce, the same date the revocable trust was amended to provide for Esther, and five days prior to the decedent's death
from cancer (R. 66-76, 100, 105, 107).
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On the date of his remarriage to Esther Taylor, September
21, 1984, decedent was on his deathbed, suffering from cancer and
was unable to walk or speak audibly.

Decedent had been extremely

ill with cancer for at least one month prior to this date (R.
100, 109), In fact, in a letter to the Marriage License Bureau
on September 20, 1984, Dr. Edward G. Jenkins, decedent's son-inlaw, stated that decedent was "very ill with a serious medical
condition" which did not allow him out of bed.

(R. 109).

In his Complaint, Wendell has alleged that decedent was mentally incompetent and incapable due to his terminal illness for
at least sixty (60) days prior to his death (R. 3). Wendell
further alleged that during this sixty day period of incompetence,
the Defendants, Esther Taylor, Darren G. Taylor and John Does 1-5
wrongfully and maliciously manipulated decedent with regard to
the preparation of trust and will documents and further, exercised undue influence over decedent in connection with his purported remarriage of Defendant Esther Taylor so as to obtain an
advantage for her from his estate.

According to the Complaint,

decedent would not have prepared these various documents or
remarried Esther Taylor if he had been in full control of his
faculties at that time (R. 2, 3, 4, 5). The decedent was concerned that as his terminal illness progressed and as stronger
medication was required in connection with this illness, "certain
people" would attempt to exercise undue influence over him with
regard to his estate and assets (R. 104).

4

Wendell's relationship with the decedent had been amicable
and brotherly (R. 102). Wendell's relationship with Defendant
Esther Taylor, however, had been extremely hostile for some years
prior to decedent's death (R.

101, 102).

Wendell did not learn of the existence of the June 30, 1984
document until January or February of 1985.

At that time he was

provided with a copy of it by his brother Noel M. Taylor (R. 169,
171).

This document's existence was not brought to Wendell's

attention earlier due to the specific directions of the decedent
as set out in the document (R. 104).
The decedent left instructions with his "benefactors" that
all

financial obligations owed him by Wendell were to be can-

celled at his death (R. 104). He was, however, concerned that
his wishes in this regard would not be carried out (R. 104). He
therefore stated in the June 30, 1984 document:
. . ."I handle this subject this way in the
hopes that the principal desire of mine to
be consummated is that Wendell will be free
of financial obligations to me and/or my
estate. I handle it with you Noel so that if
all goes as I desire and as instructed by me
that this document be destroyed without revelation. I suggest to you Noel a short period
of waiting after my passing to present this
document, if needed, in order to see an accurate
picture of the developments if a problem arises
ii

. . . .

(R. 104).
He also included a provision whereby Wendell was to "be compensated in treble for all expenses, legal and ordinary, he incurred
or will incur in resisting the dwelling debt problem as well as
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the cancelled debt."

(R. 104).

Noel M. Taylor did not become aware that Wendell was having
a problem with Defendant Esther Taylor regarding his home until
January or February of 1985 (R. 171, 176, 177). When he became
aware of Wendell's difficulties, Noel was unable to locate the
original June 30, 1984 document (R. 173, 174, 175, 176). Noel
Taylor located the original June 30, 1984 document and gave it to
Wendell sometime in the Spring of 1985 (R. 174, 175, 176, 191).
In October of 1985, Wendell commenced this action in the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County to enforce the terms of
the June 30, 1984 document (R. 2). When this action was initially commenced, Wendell's attorney at the time, Stanley S.
Adams, mistakenly attached to the Complaint a copy of the June
30, 1984 document bearing only the signatures of decedent and
Noel M. Taylor (R. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 99, 100).
On or about March 24, 1986, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
Third District Court Judge, granted Defendants' Motion For
Summary Judgment Dismissing Action With Prejudice And Awarding
Defendants Attorneys Fees (R. 235, 236). The District Court made
no finding that Wendell's action lacked merit or that Plaintiff's
conduct in bringing the suit was lacking in good faith (R. 235,
236).

Further, the District Court made no finding that the

Plaintiff or his counsel had violated any of the terms of Rule
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 235, 236).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Genuine issues of fact exist with regard to the
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influence exerted over decedent by Defendants and the decedent's
competence for a period of thirty to sixty days prior to decedent's death.
A.

Decedent was concerned about the exercise of undue
influence over him as his terminal illness
progressed (R. 104).

B.

Decedent was aware that his mental and physical condition was deteriorating and therefore the exercise
of undue influence over him was possible.

C.

The District Court made no findings of fact with
regard to the decedent's mental competence for a
period of thirty to sixty days prior to his death.

D.

The District Court made no findings of fact with
regard to the Plaintiff's allegations of undue
influence exercised by Defendants over the decedent.

E.

The District Court made no findings of fact as to
the Plaintiff's standing to challenge the validity
of decedent's August 30, 1984 will and revocable
trust agreements.

P.

Plaintiff is an "interested person" as defined by
U.C.A. § 75-1-201.

2.

Decedent substantially complied with the provisions of

the Utah Uniform Probate Code with regard to the execution of the
June 30f 1984 will/codicil.
A.

The June 30, 1984 will/codicil was executed by the
Decedent in the presence of two witnesses,
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Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine J. Taylor.
B.

Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine J. Taylor acted as witnesses of this document at the decedent's request.

C.

Subsequent to the decedent's execution of the June
30, 1984 will/codicil, Noel M. Taylor executed the
document as a witness in the presence of decedent,
Grant R. Taylor.

D.

Although Geraldine J. Taylor did not execute the
June 30, 1984 will/codicil in the presence of the
decedent, she did execute the document confirming
that she had witnessed the execution of the June 30,
1984 will/codicil.

E.

The execution of the June 30, 1984 will/codicil
substantially complied with the terms of U.C.A.
§ 75-2-502 so as to provide protection against
fraud.

F.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code is to be liberally
construed so as to discover and give effect to the
intent of the testator in the distribution of his
estate.

3.

The Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorneys

fees pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or
U.C.A. § 78-27-56.
A.

The District Court failed to make any findings that
there was wilfull violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, by the Plaintiff or his attorney
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which would give rise to an award of attorneys fees
or other sanctions under that rule.
B.

The District Court failed to make any findings of
fact with regard to the Plaintiff's alleged intent
to defeat the purpose of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

C.

The District Court made no findings of fact as to
whether or not Plaintiff's claim lacked merit as
defined in Utah law.

D.

The District Court failed to make any findings of
fact that the Plaintiff's claim was not asserted in
good faith.

E.

There is not substantial evidence in the record to
support an award of attorneys fees against the
Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants pursuant to
either Rule 11f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or
U.C.A. § 78-27-56.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

GENUINE ISSUES OP MATERIAL FACT EXIST WITH
REGARD TO DEFENDANTS ESTHER AND DARREN TAYLORS'
INFLUENCE OVER DECEDENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO
HIS DEATH AND AS TO HIS COMPETENCE FOR A PERIOD
OF SIXTY DAYS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entitles a
party to an award of summary judgment only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

9

judgment as a matter of law.

See; Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 58 5 (1982), Lockhart Company
v. Anderson, 646 P*2d 678 (1982), Geneva Pipe Company v. S&H Ins.
Co., 714 P.2d 648 (1986).

In Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 1041 (1984)

this court stated:
"A motion for summary judgment can only be
granted when 'there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact,1 and 'even assuming
the facts as asserted by the party moved
against to be true, he could not prevail.'"
"Since the party moved against is denied the
opportunity of presenting his evidence and
his contentions, it is and should be the
policy of the courts to act on such motions
with great caution, to assure that a party
whose cause might have merit is not deprived
of the right to access to the courts for
enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs."
It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should
be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail.
Frisbee v. K&K Construction Company, 676 P.2d 387 (1984), Snyder
v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 (1984), Gadd v. Olsen, supra.
In this case, the very language of the June 30, 1984 document showed that the decedent was concerned about the exercise of
undue influence over him as his serious illness progressed (R.
104).

Assuming all of the facts alleged in Wendell's Complaint

to be true and considering the clearly stated concerns of the
decedent as set out in the June 30, 1984 document, genuine issues
of fact do exist and therefore the granting of Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment by the District court was inappropriate (R.
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2-6, 104).
Although no finding was made by the District Court on this
point, Defendants contend in their Memorandum Of Points And
Authorities In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment that Wendell lacks standing to challenge the validity
of decedent's August 30, 1984 will.

They base their contention

upon the premise that Wendell is not an "interested person" as
defined by U.C.A. § 75-1-201 (20). This statute states:
"'Interested person1 includes heirs, devisees,
children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries,
and any others having a property right in or
claim against a trust estate or the estate of
a decedent, ward or protected person, which
may be affected by the proceeding. It also
includes persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and other
fiduciaries representing interested persons.
The meaning as it relates to particular persons
may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of
and matters involved in, any proceeding."
In this case, Wendell clearly is an "interested person" as
defined by this statute.

Whether or not the June 30, 1984 docu-

ment is a valid testamentary disposition, it evidences a debt
owed by Wendell to the decedent.

Wendell therefore has a pro-

perty right in or claim against the estate in the determination
of whether the debt to the estate is cancelled.
statute

Further, the

specifically provides for a case by case analysis and

determination as to who is an interested party in any proceeding.
Genuine issues of fact exist regarding the allegations of
Plaintiff's Complaint and Plaintiff's standing to contest decedent's August 30, 1984 will.

Therefore, the District Court's
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Order granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment was erroneous.
POINT II
THE JUNE 30, 1984 WILL AND/OR CODICIL WAS
PROPERLY EXECUTED IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE NECESSARY REQUISITES OF THE UTAH
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND SHOULD THEREFORE
BE TREATED AS VALID AND EFFECTIVE ACCORDING
TO ITS TERMS.
The requirements for execution of a testamentary document in
Utah are set forth in U.C.A. § 75-2-502 as follows:
"Except as provided for holographic wills,
writings within section 75-2-573, and wills
within section 75-2-506, every will shall be
in writing signed by the testator or in the
testator's name by some other person in the
testator's presence and by his direction,
and shall be signed by at least two persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing
or the testator's acknowledgment of the
signature or of the will. The signing by the
witnesses must be in the testator's presence
and in the presence of each other."
This statutory provision was enacted in 1975 and was essentially
an adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
Compliance with the final sentence of the statute is contested by the Defendants in the instant case.

Defendants in

their Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Motion
For Summary Judgment note that the purpose of such a provision is
to guard against fraud.

(See; Defendants' Memorandum In Support

Of Motion For Summary Judgment, pg. 9; 94 CJS Section Wills 189).
Defendants then rely on the language used by the Utah Supreme
Court in In Re Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d 432 (Utah 1943).
that case, the court stated:
12

In

"The right to dispose of property by will
is governed and controlled entirely by
statute. Such statutes are mandatory, andf
unless strictly complied with, the instrument, as a will, is void."
139 P.2d at 434.
Although the above quoted language provides for no exception, Plaintiff respectfully urges this court to consider several
additional factors and similar judicial authority that would lead
to a more equitable and just interpretation of the current statute governing execution of wills in Utah.

In the Editorial

Board Comment to U.C.A. § 75-2-502, the Editorial Board stated:
"The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum.
Execution under this section normally would
be accomplished by signature of the testator
and two witnesses; each of the persons
signing as witnesses must 'witness1 any of
the following: the signing of the will by
the testator, an acknowledgment by the
testator that the signature is his, or an
acknowledgment by the testator that the
document is his will." (Emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated § 75-1-102 specifically defines the purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and rules for its
construction.

This statute states:

"(1) This code shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of
this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing
persons, protected persons, minors, and
incapacitated persons;
(b) To discover and make effective
the intent of a decedent in distribution
of his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient
system for administering the estate of the
decedent in making distribution to his
13

successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement
of certain trusts; and
(e) To make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions." (Emphasis added).
The case of In Re Alexander's Estatef supray is a 1943 case,
decided long before the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code
or the initial drafting of the Utah Uniform Probate Code itself.
The court did not, therefore, attempt to construe the present
Utah Uniform Probate Code.

In that case, the testatrix1 will was

declared invalid where the testatrix had not signed the will in
the presence of the witnesses, as strictly required by statute,
but she had definitely acknowledged to the witnesses that the
instrument was her will.

This decision was a very close 3-2

decision with Justices Wade and Moffat dissenting.

In his

dissenting opintion, Justice Wade stressed the importance of
another Utah statute which provided that the statutes of this
state be construed liberally and in a manner to promote justice.
139 P«2d at 434. Justice Wade, in reviewing the facts of the
Alexander case, stated that although the testatrix had failed to
comply strictly with the statutory requirements, she clearly
thought she had made a valid will and desired disposition of her
property according to her purported will.

He then concluded:

"The legislative intent that our statutes
shall be liberally construed with a view
to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice". . . was undoubtedly
enacted to prevent the harsh results of
following to literally the exact wording
of the statutes, and, to my mind, was made
for just such a case as we have here."
139 P.2d at 434
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As previously stated, U.C.A. § 75-1-102 specifically
requires that the provisions of that Utah Uniform Probate Code be
liberally construed and applied to promote the Code's underlying
purposes.

One of the specific underlying purposes and policies

of the Utah Uniform Probate Code is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property."
A liberal construction of U.C.A. § 75-2-502 is warranted given
the specific purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and the
facts of this case.
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions with
regard to substantial compliance and liberal construction as set
out in Justice Wade's dissent.

In In Re Rudd's Estate, 369 P.2d

526 (1962), the Montana Supreme Court, interpreting a similar
wills statute stated:
"This court has held that the right to make
a will depends upon the consent of the
legislature and there must be strict compliance with the statute, but we have also
declared that substantial compliance with
the statute is sufficient."
369 P.2d at 530.
The Montana Court also defined "substantial compliance" to mean
"only that a court should determine whether the statute has been
followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it
was adopted.

The intent of the legislation being the elimination

of fraud."
In

In Re Estate Of Perkins, 504 P.2d 564 (1972), the Supreme

Court of Kansas interpreted the requirements set out in the
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Kansas statute regarding the execution and attestation of testamentary documents.

In that case, at page 568f the court stated:

"The will of the testator should be carried
out if reasonably possible and a substantial
compliance with statutory requirements is
enough. Slight or trifling departures from
technical requirements will not operate to
defeat a will." Citing Kitchell v. Bridgeman,
267 P. 26. See also Hobbs v. Mahoney, 478 P.2d
956, 958 (1970) (the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopts the 'substantial compliance doctrine;'
literal compliance with the requisites pertaining to the execution of a will is not
required.)."
It is also important to note that the provisions of U.CcA. §
68-3-2 also require that all of the statutes in Utah be liberally
construed.

This statute states:

"The rule of the common law that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes
of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of this state respecting the subjects
to which they relate, and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote
justice. Whenever there is any variance
between the rules of equity and the rules
of common law in reference to the same
matter, the rules of equity shall prevail."
(Emphasis added)
This statute has also been applied with regard to the laws of
inheritance within the State of Utah.

See; In Re Garr's Estate,

86 P. 757 (1906).
Further support for a liberal construction of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code is found in the recent case of Estate Of
Grossen v. Vincent, 657 P.2d 1345 (1983).
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There the Utah Supreme

Court considered a different section of the Probate Code, but
stated:
"The [strict] interpretation urged by the
appellants would make the decedent's will
now invalid in this state; but it could be
admitted to probate in any other state
which had adopted the Uniform Probate Code.
We will not lightly ascribe an interpretation which will produce such an incongruous
result."
In the instant case, based upon the provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code as set out in other jurisdictions, the June
30, 1984 document would have been given effect.

To require an

absolute and strict compliance wich Section 75-2-502 as it now
reads would likewise result in an "incongruous result".

The pro-

vision at issue in the present case is not a provision of the
standard Uniform Probate Code.

The very purpose of the Code was

to reduce the formalities for execution of a witnessed will to a
minimum.
The June 30, 1984 will and/or codicil of the decedent was
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary requisites
of U.C.A. § 75-2-502. The will was signed by the decedent in the
presence of both Noel M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor, the
attesting witnesses.

Noel Taylor

witnessed the will with his

signature in the presence of both decedent and his wife,
Geraldine J. Taylor, the second witness.

Geraldine J. Taylor

witnessed the will with her signature in the presence of Noel,
the other witness. There is no question that each of these witnesses were present at the time decedent executed this document.
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Therefore, each of these individuals "witnessed" the decedent's
execution of the codicil.

The only element lacking is in

Geraldine J. Taylor's failure to sign the instrument in the presence of decedent.

The requirements which were literally

complied with are sufficient to protect against fraud and therefore satisfy the very purpose for which the requirements set out
in U.C.A. § 75-2-502 are imposed.

In view of the clear legisla-

tive intent that the statutes of Utah and particularly the Utah
Uniform Probate Code be liberally construed so as to discover and
make effective the intent of a decedent in the distribution of
his property, the document at issue herein has clearly satisfied
the requirements of the law.
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this case warrant the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance regarding
the execution of a testamentary document.

The decedent's intent

with regard to the cancellation of the debt owed by Wendell to
him is absolutely clear on the face of the document.

That two

individuals witnessed his execution of the will is uncontroverted.

The fact that the technical act of Geraldine J. Taylor

signing the document did not take place at that time should not
work to upset the specific intent of the decedent with regard to
this debt. Moreover, the subsequent events involving the purported remarriage of decedent and Esther Taylor and the amendment
of the Grant R. Taylor Trust when decedent was deathly ill and
five days before his death, at the very least, raise a suspicion
of fraud.
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The Utah statute should be interpreted consistently with the
intent of the Uniform Probate Code and with other jurisdictions
allowing for substantial compliance.

Its interpretation should

also be consistent with U.C.A. §§ 75-1-102 and 68-3-2 providing
for liberal construction to promote justice and equity.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS
ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ACTION
In their Motion For Attorneys Feesf Defendants allege that
they are entitled to an award of attorneys fees due to the
"inexcusable neglect" of Wendell's attorney.

In support of this

claim Defendants cite Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
U.C.A. § 78-27-56 (R. 119-127).
The provisions of Rule 11 in effect at the time Wendell
filed his Complaint in this action state in pertinent part:
"The signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground
to support it and that it is not interposed
for delay. If a pleading is not signed or
is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may be proceed as though
the pleading had not been filed. For a wilfull violation of this rule an attorney may
be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted."
When this action was filed, a copy of the June 30, 1984
will/codicil which contained the signatures of only Grant R.
Taylor and Noel M. Taylor was mistakenly attached to the
Complaint.

The signature of Geraldine J.

19

Taylor did not appear

on this copy (R.6).

It is this error which forms the basis of

Defendants' claim for attorneys fees.
The attachment by Plaintiff's counsel of the "two signature
document", as opposed to the "three signature document", was
inadvertent.

Further, this error was corrected by Plaintiff's

Affidavit dated November 12, 1985 wherein he stated:
, "I have reviewed the Complaint that has been
filed in this matter and specifically that
June 30, 1984 'will and/or codicil' that was
attached thereto as Exhibit A. That document
is not a true and accurate copy of an original
document that I have in my possession that
bears the signatures of Grant R. Taylor, Noel
M. Taylor and Geraldine Taylor. A true and
accurate copy of the document is attached hereto
as Exhibit A." (Emphasis added).
In order for Rule 11 to be invoked, the court must find a
"wilfull violation" of the rule.

The inadvertent inclusion of

the copy of the wrong June 30, 1984 will/codicil containing only
the signatures of the decedent and Noel Taylor cannot be considered a "wilfull violation" of the rule.

Wendell's attorney's

signature on the original Complaint which included the mistaken
document, cannot be said to have been completed with the intent
to defeat the purpose of Rule 11. Further, this error was
quickly corrected and Defendants were in no way prejudiced.
Defendants also rely upon U.C.A. § 78-27-56 to support their
award of attorneys fees.

.;*

This statute provides:

"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the court may
award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that
the action or the defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith."
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This statute has been interpreted by this court in Cady v.
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (1983).

In Cady, the court set out three

requirements which must be met before attorneys fees will be
awarded under this statute. First, the party to whom fees are to
be awarded must prevail.

Second, the court must find that the

action or defense was "without merit".

Third, the court must

find that an action or defense was not brought or asserted in
good faith.
In this case, only the first requirement set out in Cady has
been met.

Defendants have prevailed on their Motion For Summary

Judgment.

The other requirements set out in Cady are not met.

The Cady court defined the term "without merit" as;
"Frivolous, or little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact."
Plaintiff's action is not "without merit" as that term is
defined in Cady, supra.
the

Wendell brought this action to enforce

provisions of the June 30, 1984 will/codicil and thereby

obtain the cancellation of a substantial debt he owed to the
decedent.

The basis of this action was the June 30, 1984

will/codicil itself and the alleged undue influence exercised
over the decedent by the Defendants.

By the very terms of the

document the decedent himself was concerned about this exercise
of undue influence.

As previously stated in Point II of this

Brief, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
the Utah Uniform Probate Code regarding the execution of this
document.

The facts in the record of this case show a factual
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and legal basis for Wendell's claims.

The issues raised in

Wendell's Complaint have substantial weight and importance and
therefore cannot be considered frivolous or "without merit".
The court in Cady also defined "good faith" as:
1.

An honest belief in the propriety of the activities
in question;

2.

No intent to take unconscionable advantage of
others;

3.

No intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question will, hinder, delay or
defraud others.

In order for attorneys fees to be awarded pursuant to U.C.A. §
78-27-56, the court stated that a party must establish a lack of
good faith by proving that "The unsuccessful party lacked at
least one of the good faith elements."

According to Cady, there-

fore,
" . . . not only must there be substantial evidence that the claim was lacking basis in
either law or fact and therefore frivolous, but
there must also be sufficient evidence that the
unsuccessful party lacked at least one of the
good faith elements heretofore stated (citations
omitted)."
671 P.2d at 152.
In the Cady case, the Supreme Court found that although the
Plaintiffs were pursuing a meritless claim that better preparation might have avoided, that conduct alone did not rise to lack
of good faith.
The Defendants in the case before the court contend that
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because Wendell's attorney failed to attach the correct document
to the initial Complaint in this action, he and Wendell are
guilty of "inexcusable neglect" and therefore, bad faith. The
attachment of the wrong will/codicil to the Complaint, however,
was merely an inadvertent error on the part of Wendell's attorney.

This inadvertence alone cannot be considered to rise to the

level of bad faith as defined by this court in Cady, supra.
Finally, it is well settled that an award of attorneys fees
must be based upon substantial evidence and findings of fact from
that evidence.

FMA Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670

(1965), Lockhart Company v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (1982), Cady_
v. Johnson, supra.

In this case, the district court made no fin-

dings of fact whatsoever with regard to the Defendants' entitlement to an award of attorneys fees, Wendell's alleged bad faith
conduct, or the alleged lack of merit of Wendell's action.
Without the required findings of fact, the award of attorneys
fees to Defendants was erroneous and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the order of the
District Court granting summary judgment and attorneys fees for
defendants should be reversed and this matter remanded for a full
trial on the merits for the following reasons:

Genuine issues of

fact exist with regard to Defendants Esther and Darren Taylor's
exercise of undue influence over the decedent immediately prior
to his death; genuine issues of fact exist with regard to the
decedent's competence for a period of thirty to sixty days prior
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to his death; genuine issues of fact exist regarding Wendell's
standing to contest decedent's August 30, 1984 will; decedent
substantially complied with the provisions of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code with regard to the execution of the June 30, 1984
will/codicil; and the District Court erred in awarding the
Defendants attorneys fees without making specific findings of
fact with regard to the purported bad faith conduct of Wendell
and the alleged lack of merit of his action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fjrf

day of March, 1987.

Attorney for Wendell E. Taylor
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /Wday of March, I served
the foregoing Appellant's Brief by mailing four (4) copies thereof
by first class United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Leland S. McCullough
P. Bryan Fishburn
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84133
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
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LAn 1 D 1 I M

***

30 June 1984
After c o n s i d e r a t i o n 1 r e e l from :.y pergonal ^uthors^in notes i n hand and d i c t a t e
t h e following i n s t r u c t i o n s t o my broth: r „oel b<icaur.« I t r u s t t h a t he v a i l follow
my orders a f t e r my 1 ipendng deird.se.
1 have not taken any Medication i n t h e l a t 24 hours except two r a i n r i l l s 1 hr ago.
This has very s l i g h t l y a f f e c t draylegs i n loco;;.otio.:. 1 re; o r t t h i s t o say t h a t
I am of a c l e a r ani sober r.dnd i n making the follovan:; d e c l a r a t i o n .
1 have a debt owed t o mo by my brother Wendell concerning h i s house on S h i r e c l i f f Ln.
i n SLC. I w i l l leave wtji my w i l l benefactors i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a l l f i n a n c i a l
o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t he (V/endell) has vdtit h-.e are t o be cancelled a t my passing. This
statement i s my u l t i m a t e d e s i r e concerning t h i s o b l i g a t i o n .
This I do because I b e l i e v e t h a t i n the pres ncc of c e r t a i n peo-lo an: by t h e i r
i n s t u c t i o n s future v/rittcn n e g o t i a t i o n s ..ay oe attest, t e i t o be made whiin I am under
t h e influence of medicines or coercion and n t of i.\y c l a r , f r e e , and sober d e s i r e s .
This I deeply and p o s i t i v e l y beieve could or w i l l happen.
I a l s o o r d e r , i n continued s o b r i e t y , t h a t i f t n i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s n f t c a r r i e d out by my
b e n e f a c t o s , as c l e a r l y a i r e c t e d t o then., t h a t Wendell be compensated i n t r e b l e for a l l
expenses^ l e g a l and ordinary, he has incurred or v d l l incur i n r e s i s t i n g the dwelling
debt problem as w e l l ai; t h e cancelled d e b t . This I have v e r b a l l y expressed t o some.
I handle t i l l s with you, i\»oel, and not with V/endell d i r e c t l y for personal rea. ens
I won't e x p l a i n . Here-in i s the documentary re-stato::.ent or" t h i s o r : e r .
Also, I handle t h i s subject t h i s way i n the hopes t h a t t h e p r i n c i b p a l d e s i r e of l i n e
t o be consumated i s t h a t Wendell w i l l be f r e e : of l i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o me and or
my e s t a t e . I handle i t vdtii you iioel so t h a t i f a l l goes as 1 d e s i r e and a s i n s t r u c t *
by me t h a t t n i s document be destroyed without r e v e l a t i o n , l suggest t o you i.oel a
s h o r t period of waiting a f t e r my passing zo present t h i s document, i f needed, i n orier
t o see an accurate p i c t u r e of t h e d e v e l o c e n t s i f a :<robU-:- a r i s e s . Your .iud^.-mcfct
in this.
I t r u s t you IMOOI as a c o u r f i e r ami witness t o ant Toi- t h i s o r ' e r .
I order t h e above explained c a n c e l l a t i o n of dent of '.venae 13. t o me or t o my e s t a t e
as p a r t of my F i n a l W i l l And Testaiacrt ani t h i s order s h a l l su- ersede any previous
order of nine o r any suusequent order of mine o r an.*' .*e e l s e on t h i s m a t t e r .

Soberly and f r e e lLyy dictate,

PJ<^I

byX^^/^

*7'

Grant H. T a ^ o r
Typed a s d i c t a t e d an.i v:itnesc\i ^r
\ool
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Attorneys for Defendants
Esther Taylor, personally and as personal representative of
the Estate of Grant R. Taylor, and Darron Taylor.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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WENDELL E. TAYLOR.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICE, AND AWARDINff
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS^FEES

Plaintiff.
vs.
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR,
deceased. ESTHER TAYLOR.
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5.

Civil No. C-85-6869
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants'
Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing before
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on Thursday, February 20, 1986, at
8:00 o'clock a.m.

Defendants were represented by Leland S.

McCullough, Esq. and P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq.
represented by Stanley S. Adams, Esq.

Plaintiff was

Based upon the Memoranda

i^UY?'?*^

filed herein, arguments of counsel, the Affidavit of P. Bryan
Fishburn as to attorneys fees, and good cause appearing,
therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.

That Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted;

2.

That this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
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That Plaintiff is to pay to Defendants their

and

reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending against this
action, such fees having been determined by the Court to be in
the amount of $ Z> , f * * '

DATED

y^V ir /J

S "• *

c

.

&*

/

. 1986.

BY THE COURT

c-J

( v/

-66c

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Third District Court Judge

ATTEST
CDN0643F

H. DIXON HINDLEY

-

2

«yVA.^, •:; ••• • ' • ' ^ ^ r ^ ^ f e r
U-C.-'-i-^ :t»

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. AND AWARDING
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES was hand delivered this
j j I /i i j" ( i

1986, to the following:

Stanley S. Adams, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
521 6th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

- 3 -

day of

Rule 56.

Summary Judgment

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on
June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "answers to interrogatories" in the third sentence.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts *re actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
Ill

(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(e) was amended by the Supreme Court
on June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment added the
words "Defense Required" in the caption, inserted "answers to interrogatories" after "depositions" and deleted the word "by" before "further
affidavits" in the third sentence, and added the last two sentences.

(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay* the court shall forthwith order the party
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him
to incur, reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Rule 11.

Signing of Pleadings

Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney who
is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The address of
the attorney and that of the party shall be stated. Every party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadings
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
an affidavit. The signature of any attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
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CONSTRUCTION

68-3-2

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed — Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489;
C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-2.
Cross-References. — One form of civil ac-

tion; law and equity administered in same action, Utah Const, Art. VHI, Sec. 19; Rule 2,
U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Actions against state.
Amendment of pleadings.
Bastardy proceedings.
Decisions of foreign courts.
Garnishment proceedings.
Inheritance laws.
Liability of city.
Life insurance.
Penal statutes.
Questions of novel impression.
Remedial statutes.
Rules of equity prevail.
— Forfeitures.
Statutes of foreign states.
Worker's compensation.
In general.
This section abrogates the common-law rule.
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757
<1906>; State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 432, 226 P.
904 (1924).
This section is mandatory. Hammond v.
Wall 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918).
Where a statute charges one with a duty or
imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so
with sufficient clarity that one of ordinary intelligence will understand what he is required
to do, and. in case of alternative choices, he can
comply by selecting the one least burdensome
to him. Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333
P.2d 943 (1959).
Statutes are to be liberally construed to give
effect to their purpose and promote justice but
they are not to be distorted beyond the intent
of the legislature. Stanton Transp. Co. v.
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959).

Actions against state.
Statute giving right to sue the state must be
construed so as to give effect to intent of the
Legislature. There must be substantial compliance with the designated statutory procedure
for bringing such actions. State v. District
Court, 102 Utah 284, 115 P.2d 913 (1941); 102
Utah 290, 128 P.2d 471 (1942).
Amendment of pleadings.
Seemingly, clause of this section, which requires provisions of statutes and proceedings
under them to be liberally construed with view
to effect statutes' objects and to promote justice, applies, at least in matter of amendment
of pleading, as well when it is statutes of another state, as when it is statutes of Utah,
which are involved. Pugmire v. Diamond Coal
& Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P. 385 (1903)
(decided under prior law).
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75-1-102. Purposes—Rule of construction.—(1) This code shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated
persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors;

SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL PROVISIONS

75-1-106

(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
History: G 1953, 75-1-102, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 2.
J

Collateral References.
Wills<5=>203.

95 C.J.S. Wills § 308.
79 Am. Jur 2d 880, WiUs § 827.
#
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic
Service, Uniform Probate Code.

DEFINITIONS

75-1-201

(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person which may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matters involved
in, any proceeding.

75-2-502. Execution.—Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within section 75-2-513, and wills within section 75-2-506, every
will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name
by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either
the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the
will The signing by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence
and in the presence of each other.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-502, enacted
by L, 1975, ch. 150, § 3 .
Editorial Board Comment.
The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum. Execution under this section normally would be accomplished by signature of the testator and of two witnesses;
each of the persons signing as witnesses
must "witness" any of the following:
the signing of the will by the testator,
an acknowledgment by the testator that
the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator that the document
is his will. Signing by the testator may
be by mark under general rules relating
to what constitutes a signature; or the
will may be signed on behalf of the
testator by another person signing the
testator's name at his direction and in
his presence. There is no requirement
that the testator publish the document
as his will, or that he request the witnesses to sign, or that the witnesses
sijrn in the presence of the testator or of
each other. The testator may sign the
will outside the presence of the witnesses
if he later acknowledges to the witnesses
that the signature is his or that the document is his will, and they sign as witnesses. [Last sentence in Utah version
omitted in official text of Code.] There
is no requirement that the testator's
signature be at the end of the will; thus,
if he writes his name in the body of
the will and intends it to be his signature, this would satisfy the statute. The
intent is to validate wills which meet
the minimal formalities of the statute.
A will which does not meet these requirements may be valid under section
75-2-503 as a holograph.
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Cross-References.
Probate and administration, 75-3-101
et seq.
Proof of will, 78-25-12.
Collateral References.
Wills<3=nil, 113-123.
94 C J.S. Wills §§ 169-177,182-197.
79 Am. Jur. 2d 430, Wills § 210.
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic
Service, Uniform Probate Code.
Admissibility and credibility of testimony of subscribing witness tending to
impeach execution of will or testamentary capacity of testator, 79 A. L. R.
394.
Admissibility of evidence other than
testimony of subscribing witnesses to
prove due execution of will, or testamentary capacity, 63 A. L. R. 1195.
Admissibility of testator's declarations
upon issue of genuineness or due execution of purported will, 62 A. L. R. 2d
855.
Assistance: validity of will signed by
testator with the assistance of another,
98 A. L. R. 2d 824.
"Attestation" or "witnessing" of will,
required by statute, as including witnesses' subscription, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1365.
Beneficiary under nuncupative will as
witness thereto, 28 A. L. R. 2d 796.
Character as w i t n e s s of one who
signed will for another purpose, 8 A. L
R. 1075.
Character of instrument as will, or its
admissibility to probate as such, as affected by its failure to make any disposition of property or by fact that
there is no beneficiary entitled to take
thereunder, 147 A. L. R. 636.
Codicil as affecting application of statutory provision to will, or previous codicil not otherwise subject, or as obviating
objections to lack of testamentary ca-

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-57

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement,
the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.
Meaning of "without merit'* and "good
faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit/' but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief that it is appropriate, and as long as

there is no intent to hinder, delay, defraud or
take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson
(1983) 671 P 2d 149.
Law Reviews. — Attorney's Fees in Utah,
1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Merit less Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593.

